Logic Model Checking of Unintended Acceleration Claims in Toyota Vehicles

Ed Gamble
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
California Institute of Technology
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(joint work w/ Gerard Holzmann)
Introduction
Toyota had the death of a CHP Officer to explain
Toyota had a growing number of unsubstantiated reports of ‘Sudden Unintended Acceleration’
The US Department of Transportation promised to ‘get into the weeds’
Engine Control Systems share similarities with Spacecraft Control Systems

- Safety/Mission Critical
- Asynchronous
- Hard Real-Time
- Fault Tolerant
- Resource Constrained
- Environmentally Challenged
The JPL ‘Laboratory for Reliable Software’ Knows How to Find Subtle Software and System Problems

Core Technologies

Static Analysis (software)

Logic Model Checking (software and systems)
The US DOT, through NASA, (Michael Aguilar, NESC) established a team

- Software analysis included JPL and Ames
- Other NASA teams: ..., radiation, human factors
- Worked at Toyota HQ
- Developed IP protection protocols
- Toyota provided domain experts (+ Japanese trans.)
- Got the ’05 Camry L4 Software quickly!
Throttle Control System And Software
Throttle Control
System Overview

[Figure 6.4.1-1 - Abstracted]
Throttle Control
Motor Drive IC

mainCPU CPU w/ Software

MotorIC

H-Bridge

Throttle
Throttle Control
Software Overview

[Appendix A Figures - Merged]
Throttle Control Software/ System Properties

- NEC V850 E1 (32 βH) embedded controller
- ANSI C, GreenHills tools
- files, kSLOC
- OSEK OS (auto. std.)
- tasks, priorities, shared resource
- Two rate classes
  - Time: Hz / ms
  - Crank: rpm
- ‘Product Line’ code
- strict inheritance, coding rules and process rqmts; in Japanese
Unintended Acceleration Properties and Implications

- Properties
  - Very Low Probability
  - Unreproducible
  - No persistent damage
  - No OBD II codes

- Implications (Software)
  - Masquerade as correct
  - Later in the processing
  - Multi-factor boundary condition
Static Analysis
Why Static Analysis?

- Static Analysis can:
  - Identify *legitimate* software errors
  - Be performed relatively *quickly* and *uniformly*
  - Be *customized* for the software coding style
  - Provide a general *sense* of the software quality
Static Analysis Tools

- A suite of Static Analysis tools were applied:
  - **CodeSonar**: Augmented with ‘JPL Coding Standards’
  - **Coverity**: Augmented with ‘Power of Ten’ rules
  - **GCC**: Strict compilation flags
  - **Uno**: As provided
Can’t tell you about these...
Static Analysis Results

The Static Analysis results are redacted in the public NASA report to the DOT. Possible reasons:

- A comparison between EETCS software and spacecraft FSW was considered inappropriate,

- An assessment of software risk, based on the statistics of static analysis results, was considered inappropriate given that a cause for SUA was not identified.
Logic Model Checking
What is Logic Model Checking?

- Verify the correctness of a system using a model of the system’s behavior.
- **Logic**: Define system correctness using linear temporal logic (LTL)
- **Model**: Develop a model of the system behavior using PROMELA (Process Meta Language)
- **Checking**: Exhaustively search the model behavior for violations of the correctness claims
- Report behavior ‘trails’
What is Logic Model Checking?

- Violations (all invalid executions)
- System Behavior (all possible executions)
- Erroneous Executions

explore all executions; definitive conclusions; no probability

Verifications w/ SPIN and SWARM technology

Ed Gamble @ INCOSE-LA, 18 Sept 2012
Why Logic Model Checking?

- Logic Model Checking (with SPIN verification) can:
  - Explore all possible states of the model
  - Provide definitive right or wrong conclusions
  - Yield conclusions without regard to probability
  - Express statements of correct behavior easily
# LTL Formulae

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formula</th>
<th>Reading</th>
<th>Template</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[]p</td>
<td>always p</td>
<td>invariance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;&gt;p</td>
<td>eventually p</td>
<td>guarantee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p -&gt; &lt;&gt;q</td>
<td>p implies eventually q</td>
<td>response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p -&gt; q U r</td>
<td>p implies q until r</td>
<td>precedence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[]&lt;&gt;p</td>
<td>always eventually p</td>
<td>recurrence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;&gt;[]p</td>
<td>eventually always p</td>
<td>stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;&gt;p -&gt; &lt;&gt;q</td>
<td>eventually p implies eventually q</td>
<td>correlation</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Logic Model Analyses
System Context

Brake: B  Gas Pedal: G  Cruise Cntrl: C

Environment: E  Engine ECU  Throttle Angle: A
## Logic Models Implemented

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Logic Model</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Conclusion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interrupt Enable / Disable Pairing</td>
<td>Computation</td>
<td>Verified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accel. Pedal Learning</td>
<td>Computation</td>
<td>Inconclusive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sensor Input</td>
<td>I/O</td>
<td>Potential Issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor Drive IC</td>
<td>Computation</td>
<td>Verified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Reg. Input</td>
<td>I/O</td>
<td>Verified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PWM Functionality</td>
<td>Computation</td>
<td>Potential Issue</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Motor Drive IC
Motor Drive IC Correctness

1. The throttle plate is never eventually always wide-open unless the inputs are always demanding wide-open.

2. An electrical short never occurs unless the inputs demand that an electrical short occur.

3. All SR-latches are never in their unstable state (S=1, R=1 simultaneously).
Motor Drive IC Logic Model

- Two Promela processes: randomize all inputs and update all outputs.
- Handle ‘over temp’ and ‘over current’ cases
  - Include ‘pre-drive’ logic (later version)
- Assertions for SR-Latch instability
Motor Drive IC Results

1. **Verified** -> It is provably impossible for inputs to drive the throttle plate wide open (unless demanded).

2. **Verified** -> It is provably impossible for inputs to drive the H-bridge to an electrical short (unless demanded).
   - Additional detail: if driven to a short the ‘pre-drive’ prevents an H-bridge short.

3. **Failed** -> SR-latch can be unstable
   - Additional detail: not actually an SR-latch
The PWM drives the motor, through the MotorIC, open or closed based on a desired throttle angle.
PWM Correctness

1. PWM output signals never eventually lead to an H-bridge short.

2. PWM output signals never eventually always drive the throttle wide open unless demanded.
PWM Results

1. **Failed** -> Under suitable conditions the H-bridge circuit can be driven to an electrical short.
   - PWM mode is ‘PWMPLS’; duty cycle is less than but near $\square\%$; $\square\mu$s task is delayed by $\sim\square\mu$s; the PWM mode transitions to PWMMNS.
   - Note: Prevented by MotorIC ‘pre-drive’ logic

2. **Verified** -> It is provably impossible for inputs to drive the throttle plate always wide open (unless demanded)
### NHTSA Findings and Observations

<p>| | |</p>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>F-10</strong></td>
<td>Extensive software testing and analysis was performed on TMC 2005 Camry L4 source code using static analysis, logic model testing, recursion testing, and worse case execution timing. With the tools utilized during the course of this study, software defects that unilaterally cause a UA were not found.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **O-6** | While not resulting in a design vulnerability, the MY 2005 Camry source code required unique code inspection tools, and manual inspections due to:  
  a) The TMC software development process uses a proprietary developed coding standard.  
  b) Industry standard static analysis tools provide automated code inspections based upon industry standard code implementations. |
| **O-7** | There are no methods for capturing pre-event software state and performance following a UA event either on the vehicle or as a diagnostic tool. |
Modeling Lessons Learned

- Simulation - enables randomly driven software to receive relevant external inputs
  - no simulations, hardware rich environment

- Delineated Critical Software - enables modeling to focus on most important software modules
  - no explicit boundaries, code intermixed
Modeling Lessons Learned

- Locality of Software State - enables SPIN ‘c_code’ modeling
  - Numerous global variable references
- Interface Definition, Modularity - enables exhaustive search of well-defined interfaces
  - Complex module interdependencies
Summary

- Part of the US DOT investigation of Toyota SUA involved analysis of the throttle control software.

- JPL LaRS applied several techniques, including static analysis and logic model checking, to the software.

- A handful of logic models were built.

- Some weaknesses were identified; however, no cause for SUA was found.

- The full NASA report includes numerous other analyses.