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# **Risk Management Best Practices**

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# Outline

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- **Comparison of Risk Assessment Criteria**
- **Aerospace Process Overview**
- **Aerospace Case Study**
- **JPL Process Overview**
- **JPL Case Study**
- **Emerging consensus**
  - **What is “Standardized”**
  - **What is “Standardizable”**
  - **What should be “Tailorable”**
    - / **Across Space Industry**
    - / **Within an organization’s process**
- **Where we choose to disagree**
- **Conclusion**


# Comparison of Risk Assessment Criteria

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1. **Risk Management Guide For DoD Acquisition, June 2003**
2. **ISO 17666, Space Systems – Risk Management**
3. **Risk Assessment at Aerospace**
4. **Risk Assessment at JPL**
5. **Proposed Example of “Geometrically-Calibrated” Qualitative Matrix**
6. **Proposed Semi-Quantitative Geometric Likelihood & Consequence Scales and Risk Rating Matrices (In Percents & In Dollars)**
7. **Proposed Quantitative Geometric (Log-Log) Risk Rating Field (In Dollars)**

# 1. Risk Management Guide For DoD Acquisition, June 2003


## Example of Risk Assessment



## 2. ISO 17666, Space Systems – Risk Management

### Example of Risk Assessment

Risk Index	Risk Magnitude	Proposed Actions
E4, E5, D5	Very High	Unacceptable risk: implement new team process or change baseline - seek project management attention at appropriate high management level as defined in the risk management plan.
E2, D3, C4, B5	Medium	Unacceptable risk: aggressively manage, consider alternative team process or baseline - seek attention at appropriate management level as defined in the risk management plan.
C1, B1, A1, B2, A2, A3, A4	Very Low	Acceptable risk: See above.



Score	Likelihood	Likelihood of Occurrence
E	Maximum	Certain to occur, will occur one or more times per project
D	High	Will occur frequently, about 1 in 10 projects
C	Medium	Will occur sometimes, about 1 in 100 projects
B	Low	Will seldom occur, about 1 in 1,000 projects
A	Minimum	Will almost never occur, 1 of 10,000 or more projects


Score	Severity	Severity of consequence: impact on (for example) cost
5	Catastrophic	Leads to termination of the project
4	Critical	Project cost increase > tbd %
3	Major	Project cost increase > tbd %
2	Significant	Project cost increase > tbd %
1	Negligible	Minimal or no impact

### 3. Risk Assessment at Aerospace

## The Continuous Aerospace Risk Management and Assessment (CARMA) Tool

#### NOTES:

1. Colored areas are to be defined by each program manager
2. Required actions to be defined by each program manager



#### Likelihood scale (0 – 1)


- Uses actual estimates of event probability
- Log scale in lower region to capture low consequence – high probability events
- User can select order of magnitude if better data not available

#### Consequence scale (0 – 1)

- considers mission or program loss as maximum potential impact
- relates major cost and schedule impacts to fractions of mission loss
- program defines schedule delay and cost overrun “programmatically equivalent” to loss of a full mission)

### 3. Risk Assessment at Aerospace (Cont'd) Cost-Benefit Evaluation

- Risk control measures for major items is applied from perspective of maximizing benefit (risk-reduction equivalent worth) and minimizing cost (resources and \$ needed for implementation)
  - Saves program resources
  - Focuses risk control on actions with best return-on-investment



#### Cost-Benefit Indices :

$$\text{Ratio} = \Delta R / C$$

$$\text{Net Benefit} = \Delta R - C$$

$$\bullet \Delta R = \begin{matrix} \text{Risk Reduction} \\ \text{Worth of a Control} \end{matrix} = \Delta(\text{Prob. X Severity})$$

(normalized to cost dimension)

$$C = \text{Implementation Cost of a Control}$$

## 4. Risk Assessment at JPL

**Type of Risk** (Check one or both)

- Mission Risk  
 Implementation Risk

**Likelihood of Occurrence** (Circle One)

Level	Level Definition
5	Very High >70%, almost certain
4	High >50%, More likely than not
3	Moderate >30%, Significant likelihood
2	Low >1%, Unlikely
1	Very Low <1%, Very unlikely


**Consequence of Occurrence**

(Circle one for each type checked above)

Level	Mission Risk Level Definitions
5	Mission failure
4	Significant reduction in mission return
3	Moderate reduction in mission return
2	Small reduction in mission return
1	Minimal (or no) impact to mission

Level	Implementation Risk Level Definition
5	Overrun budget and contingency cannot meet launch
4	Consume all contingency, budget or schedule
3	Significant reduction in contingency or launch slack
2	Small reduction in contingency or launch slack
1	Minimal reduction in contingency or launch slack

### Risk Matrix



**LEGEND**

	<b>High -</b> Implement new process(es) or change baseline plan(s)
	<b>Med -</b> Aggressively manage; consider alternative process
	<b>Low -</b> Monitor

Green  
or  
Yellow  
?

## JPL/ NASA "Near-Standard" Risk Assessment Criteria (5X5 Matrix)

## 5. Proposed Example of “Geometrically-Calibrated” Qualitative Matrix (S. Guarro)

**“Geometric” Risk Matrix Compatible with Quantitative Framework**

<b>Likelihood</b>	<b>E</b>		<b>Medium</b>	<b>High</b>	<b>High</b>	<b>Very High</b>
	<b>D</b>		<b>Medium</b>	<b>Medium</b>	<b>High</b>	<b>High</b>
	<b>C</b>			<b>Medium</b>	<b>Medium</b>	<b>High</b>
	<b>B</b>					<b>Medium</b>
	<b>A</b>					
		<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
		<b>Severity</b>				

**Likelihood Table**

Bin / Category	Qualitative Descriptor	Quantitative Probability OOM *	Quantitative OOM Definition
		p ~ 1/1000 per mission	0 < p <= 3/1000 per mission
		p ~ 1/100 per mission	4/1000 < p <= 3/100 per mission
<b>C</b>	<b>Medium</b>	p ~ 1/10 per mission	4/100 < p < 2/10 per mission
		p ~ 1/3 per mission	2/10 <= p <= 3/10 per mission
		p ~ 2/3 per mission	4/10 < p <= 1 per mission

\* OOM = Order of Magnitude

**Outcome Severity Table**

Bin / Category	Summary-Level Qualitative Descriptor	Quantitative Order of Magnitude of Outcome Severity	Qualitative Severity Definition / Assessment in Mission Performance Terms	Qualitative Severity Definition / Assessment in Mission Schedule Terms
		~3% Performance / Schedule Utility Loss (1-5% range)	Minor deviation from required performance of primary mission	Minor deviation from required primary mission schedule
		~10% Performance / Schedule Utility Loss (6-15% range)	Significant but non-impairing deviation from required performance of primary mission; or Impairing deviation from required performance of secondary mission	Significant but non-impairing deviation from required primary mission schedule; or Impairing deviation from required secondary mission schedule
<b>3</b>	<b>Medium</b>	~30% Performance / Schedule Utility Loss (16-45% range)	Impairing deviation from required performance of primary mission; or severely-impairing deviation from required performance of secondary mission	Impairing deviation from required primary mission schedule; or severely-impairing deviation from secondary mission schedule
		~60% Performance / Schedule Utility Loss (46-75% range)	Severely-impairing deviation from required performance of primary mission; or failure of secondary mission	Severely-impairing deviation from primary mission schedule; or massive schedule delay makes secondary mission worthless
		~100% Performance / Schedule Utility Loss (86-100% range)	Failure of primary mission	Schedule delay makes primary mission worthless


## 6. Proposed Semi-Quantitative Geometric Likelihood & Consequence Scales (R. Dar)

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Score	Consequence	Severity of consequence
5	Very High	100% of mission cost is lost
4	High	10% of mission cost is lost
3	Medium	1% mission cost is lost
2	Low	0.1% of mission cost is lost
1	Very Low	0.01% of mission cost is lost
Score	Likelihood	Likelihood of occurrence
E	Very High	Will certainly occur, about 1 in 1 mission
D	High	Will occur frequently, about 1 in 10 missions
C	Medium	Will occur sometimes, about 1 in 100 missions
B	Low	Will seldom occur, about 1 in 1000 missions
A	Very Low	Will almost never occur, about 1 in 10000 missions


## 6. Proposed Semi-Quantitative Geometric Risk Rating Matrix (In Percents) (R. Dar)

LIKELIHOOD




## 6. Proposed Semi-Quantitative Geometric Risk Rating Matrix (In Dollars) (R. Dar)

LIKELIHOOD



# 7. Proposed Quantitative Geometric (Log-Log) Risk Rating Field (In Dollars) (R. Dar)

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# Aerospace Process Overview





Figure 2-1. Risk Management Structure

Ref. Risk Management Guide for DoD Acquisition, June 2003




# Aerospace Case Study

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- Program used CARMA scales for an independent risk management process (separate from contractors)
- Set end of scale values equivalent to loss of most expensive vehicle
  - Maximum cost to total cost of single vehicle
  - Maximum schedule delay to 1 year (center on which vehicles were launched)
- Risks affecting less expensive vehicles were scaled accordingly
- Selected likelihood based on order of magnitude only, did not use more precise values
- Risk identification forms were made available to entire team
- Lessons
  - Risk review and boards should be held at least once per month
  - It may take several months to get process moving
  - Automating transfer of data speeds the process
  - Need to ensure the entire team understand the scales and the way risks will be ranked
  - Team must clearly see the benefit of participating in the process

# JPL Process Overview



SRL= Significant Risk List

# JPL Case Study

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## Project XYZ Risk Management Summary

- Used 3X3 matrix
- Combined mission and Implementation Risk in same consequence definitions
- Required a mitigation plan for all red and yellow risks
- Used risk liens as a measure of adequacy of budget reserves
- Integrated risks from major partner/ suppliers into project risk list if criteria were met
- Found that outside risk consultants (part time) did not work – process needs to be managed by a team member

## Lessons Learned

- Process needs advocacy at the PM level
- Can best get team members attention from a respected team member
- Need one project list, and need to tie resource liens to the risks
- Needs regular (more frequently than 1/ month) team attention
- 5X5 matrix would probably allow less “centralization” of the risk assessments
- Needs half-time dedicated to keeping the process moving

# Emerging Consensus

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## What is Standardized?

- **Assess Risk by “measuring” risk likelihood and consequence against a “measuring stick”**
- **At least at the beginning of a program/ project, the “measuring stick should be not too highly resolved – a scale of 5 levels (bins) is widely used**
- **Likelihood goes from ~0 to 1!**

# Emerging Consensus

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## What is Standardizable?

- **Should the scales (measuring sticks) be linear?**
  - **Aerospace believes that the log scale they use, at least for the lower level risks, allows more accurate differentiation (risks high in consequence but < 10% likelihood)**
  - **JPL/ NASA have not consensed on this corner of the 5X5**
- **Should the scales be standardized?**
  - **JPL not too sensitive to varying scales among projects**
- **Should the allocations of the boxes in the matrix (whatever the dimensions) be standardized?**
  - **JPL management favors a common reporting format – standardized distribution of red, yellow and green, even though not sensitive to varying scales.**

# Emerging Consensus

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## What should be Tailorable?

- **Scales**
  - Most JPL projects not sensitive to the green levels for project risks – but the likelihood scales offer a tailorable measure of the degree of risk aversion
- **Risk Strategy**
  - JPL has some variability on how to deal with red and yellow risks. All treat green risks as “accept and watch”
- **Other aspects of Risk Management**
  - Tools/ data bases are selected by the practitioners – no tool seems easy to everyone.
  - Quantitative methods
    - / Many use dollars to quantize risk against the reserves
    - / Little or no use of other measures, except in the PRA sense of assessing risk to mission objectives.

# Where We Choose to Disagree

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- **Scales**
  - **NASA/ JPL using basically “Linear” scales**
  - **Aerospace looking to emphasize distinction of low likelihood/ low consequence risks by using “logarithmic” scales**
- **Degree of Standardization possible**
  - **NASA and JPL tending to standardize risk matrix and criteria**
  - **Differences in approach between Risk Management and Risk Reporting being sorted out**
  - **Aerospace does not have standardization as a desirable objective**