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## Space Hardware Test Effectiveness

**JPL/NASA**  
Produce Assurance Program Assessment Project

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## INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND

### *The Winds of Change*

- the past is a hard act to follow
- the missions are more difficult
- the funding is constrained
- the development guidelines are different

### *The Basic Problems*

- the separation of causes & effects  
(or the nice-to-do from the required)
- the loss of the familiar
- the unknowns of the new

### *The Reassessment of the Assurance Processes*

- what are we doing ?
- how well are we doing ?
- what should we be doing ?

## REPORTS OF FLIGHT ANOMALIES

### *Indication of Things That Were Missed*

- in the mission design
- in the equipment design
- in the test program
- in the training (design & operations)

### *Indication of Performance Trends*

- for various types of equipment
- for the use of redundancy
- for lifetime estimates (failure rates)

### *Indication of Assurance Program Effectiveness*

- compared to expectations
- compared to earlier flights
- compared to other programs  
(at JPL, NASA, DoD, & Commercial<sup>2</sup>)

## REPORTS OF PREFLIGHT TEST ANOMALIES

### *Used To Develop Confidence*

- in the flight equipment design
- in the workmanship
- in the performance margins
- in analytical modeling

### *Used To Establish Trends*

- in equipment failures (type & rate)
- in test levels & durations
- in **ground/flight failure** correlations

### *Used To Indicate Test Effectiveness*

- for various simulated environments
- for various test tailoring techniques
- for the test program content & **adequacy**

## EVALUATION OF FLIGHT PERFORMANCE

### *Provides A Basis For Comparisons*

- of mission performance to causal effects  
( such as cost & complexity)
- of payload development methods  
( in-house vs. contracted)
- of assurance philosophies  
( **payload** class, development center)
- of flight system design approaches

### *Provides The Significance Of Failures*

- to the use of redundancy
- **to the use of work-arounds**
- to the functional interactions of systems

### *Provides Guidance For Improvements*

- in defining mission/science objectives
- in maintaining development focus
- in tailoring assurance requirements
- in making risk/cost/benefit trades

## THE ROLE OF RISK WITHOUT FAILURE

### *Development Risk*

- management of cost/schedule/scope
- the cost of implementing assurance
- the costs of complexity & conservatism
- trend from custom-made to inherited or commercial equipment

### *Performance Risk*

- the need for a "balanced" assurance program (more than just electronics)
- the measurement & manipulation of risk
- the calibration of lifetime predictions

### *Programmatic Risk*

- the paradox of fixed cost & variable scope
- the paradox of low cost & high expectation
- the paradox of lower funding for assurance & the insertion of new technology

## SITUATION RECAP

### *Looking At The Past*

- comprehensive assurance programs evolved
- they were **largely** successful
- they were **expensive**

### *Looking At The Present*

- comprehensive programs are too expensive  
(**minority** position disagrees)
- relative importance of assurance program elements is difficult to quantify
- the new missions are **equally** difficult

### *Looking At The Future*

- a decline of custom made equipment  
(less control of design & parts)
- a trend toward more assurance testing  
(with emphasis on performance margin &  
time-between-failure tests)